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IAmReboot: Malicious NuGet packages exploit loophole in MSBuild integrations

ReversingLabs has highlighted threats in npm, PyPI and RubyGEMS in recent years. This finding shows NuGet is equally exposed to malicious activities by threat actors.

Karlo Zanki
Blog Author

Karlo Zanki, Reverse Engineer at ReversingLabs.


ReversingLabs has identified connections between a malicious campaign that was recently discovered and reported by the firm Phylum and several hundred malicious packages published to the NuGet package manager since the beginning of August. The latest discoveries are evidence of what seems to be an ongoing and coordinated campaign.

Furthermore, ReversingLabs research shows how malicious actors are continuously improving their techniques and responding to the disruption of their campaigns. Specifically, threat actors have moved from simple downloaders executing inside install scripts to a more refined approach that exploits NuGet’s MSBuild integrations feature.

An IAmRoot reboot? Revisiting a hidden code execution technique

On October 15, three packages exploiting a previously unseen execution technique were published to the NuGet repository: ZendeskApi.Client.V2, Betalgo.Open.AI, and Forge.Open.AI. These are typosquatting on popular Nuget packages named ZendeskApi.Client, Betalgo.OpenAI and Forge.OpenAI

Typosquatting attacks are common, as we have reported. But these packages employed an unusual code execution technique that is worth mentioning. Most of the malware published to the NuGet repository places malicious code inside the initialization and post installation PowerShell scripts. These packages use a different approach, with the malicious functionality placed inside the <packageID>.targets file in the “build” directory. 

The first NuGet package we detected using this technique for malicious purposes was version 6.5.3 of Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.Build.Config package. Versions 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of this package contained malicious functionality in initialization PowerShell scripts, but version 6.5.3 didn’t include them. Instead, the malicious functionality was placed inside the <packageID>.targets file in the “build” directory. 

Malicious content

Figure 1: Malicious content inside the Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.Build.Config.targets file 


The code encapsulated inside the <Code> property of this XML file is almost identical to the functionality present in the PowerShell scripts from the earlier two versions of the package. When run, it downloads an executable from a remote location and executes it in a new process. Since we haven’t previously seen malware with the malicious functionality observed in the .targets files, we did a bit of research, which led to some interesting discoveries. 

First, the string artifact in the first line of the file, “IAmRootDemo” led us to the root of this execution technique. Several years ago, in 2019, the IAmRoot package was published by C. Augusto Proiete. The purpose of the package: “To demonstrate that any NuGet package can run arbitrary code on your machine.”

IAmRoot uses MSBuild integrations, which were added in NuGet v2.5 to improve the support for native projects, to achieve execution. How does it function? As described in the NuGet release notes: “When NuGet installs a package with \build files, it will add an MSBuild <Import> element in the project file pointing to the .targets and .props files.” 

The sneaky part is that MSBuild files can include inline tasks, which can contain executable code. Imagine you are developing package A and you want your package to use package B. Package B contains a .targets file with an inline task containing executable code. When you add package B to your package A, the content of .targets file from package B gets imported into the project file of package A. From that moment on, every time package A is built, inline tasks from the imported .targets file will get executed. There has been an ongoing discussion about the security implications of such mechanisms in NuGet’s GitHub repository, but the issue hasn’t been resolved.

We’re now dealing with the consequences of that. Based on our research, this is the first known example of malware published to the NuGet repository exploiting this inline tasks feature to execute malware.

Based on our research, this is the first known example of malware published to the NuGet repository exploiting this inline tasks feature to execute malware.

Utilizing MSBuild integrations

Figure 2: Utilizing MSBuild integrations to execute malicious code in NuGet packages

All in the (malware) family

The three previously mentioned packages — ZendeskApi.Client.V2, Betalgo.Open.AI, Forge.Open.AI — are  clearly part of the same ongoing campaign, started in August, and are very similar to the Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.Build.Config package. They contain almost identical functionality in the .targets file (Figure 1), except that the obfuscated stage 2 payload is in the latest case downloaded from a GitHub repository and not from an attacker controlled IP address. 

The malware authors also tried to make the malicious code harder to spot by using spaces and tabs to move it outside of the content visible within the default screen width. (ReversingLabs researcher Lucija Valentić observed a similar technique used in campaign on the Python Package Index (PyPI) in February.) They also inflated the download count numbers to make the package look more trustworthy, as evidenced by the vast majority of package downloads being attributed to an “unknown” client, versus some version of the NuGet client.

The malicious NuGet packages were detected by ReversingLabs within less than 24 hours of being published and were reported to the NuGet security team and removed shortly after preventing a more severe impact of the campaign. This discovery has been linked to a previous campaign which utilized init.ps1 scripts to achieve code execution. 

One week later on Sunday, October 22, we observed malicious actors preparing to publish another set of malicious NuGet packages. Threat actors created several packages and published two versions that contained benign code in the .targets file that writes a simple message to the console. 

Version stats for one of the malicious packages

Figure 3: Version stats for one of the malicious packages


The next day, downloads for the package were pumped up to make package statistics look more trustworthy. Then, on October 24, the malicious versions of the packages were finally published. They contained the same downloader functionality, fetching the stage 2 malware payload from the newly created, throwaway GitHub repository. This time, the Stage 2 malware was a .NET executable which executes an obfuscated command line embedded as a resource. 

Newly created, throwaway GitHub account

Figure 4: Newly created, throwaway GitHub account


The packages published in this group imitated popular packages published by the following NuGet publishers: CDataSoftware, ServiceTitan, cloudextend-oss and syntellect. These typosquatting attacks were very convincing, using the same icons for packages and package names that differed by only a single dot. Such decoy packages would be difficult for a developer to identify without close inspection of the packages to spot these subtle differences (Figure 5).  

Search results displaying an legitimate (top) and malicious, typo-squatted package

Figure 5: Search results displaying an legitimate (top) and malicious, typo-squatted package


This is more proof that the threat actor behind this campaign is being careful and paying attention to details, and is determined to keep this malicious campaign alive and active.

Round up the usual code execution techniques!

As noted, the latest packages have strong links to a campaign described in a recent research blog post published by Phylum on October 6. That research described a typosquatting campaign delivering SeroXen RAT. In that campaign, the malware used a well-known execution technique that was also observed in a campaign distributing the Impala Stealer and reported by JFrog in March, 2023.

In both cases downloader functionality was placed into PowerShell scripts located inside the “tools” directory of the NuGet package. This included init.ps1, install.ps1 and uninstall.ps1 scripts, which are run on certain events including installation and uninstallation of a package, depending on the version of the Visual Studio. These scripts are deprecated by newer versions of the NuGet format, but Visual Studio still executes the content inside the init.ps1 script upon installation of a NuGet package, regardless of whether it is specified in the .nuspec file. 

This autorun mechanism is quite a popular technique for code execution in NuGet packages and the packages Phylum reported are a part of a broader, previously unreported campaign started in August 2023. This campaign was quite noisy, and included more than 700 packages which were quickly detected and removed from the NuGet repository. They very likely didn’t have a big impact. The packages detected by Phylum weren’t very sophisticated and contained only the basic files required to satisfy NuGet requirements. Even the name of the .nuspec file didn’t conform with NuGet package ID naming convention, making it easier to spot. 

Content of the malicious Nughettt.TestPO package

Figure 6: Content of the malicious Nughettt.TestPO package published in August


The malicious functionality was fairly simple. It was located in the tools/init.ps1 script and downloaded a stage 2 payload from a remote location and executed it afterwards.

Content of the init.ps1 script

Figure 7: Content of the init.ps1 script from one of the detected packages

The first package published as a part of that campaign was Nughettt.TestPO, published on August 1st. There were several connections between the 700 packages published in August and the packages from Phylum’s report. The first one is the comment “# IGBOAT Crew” detected in the code from both groups of packages. More proof of this was found in the fafagewg.nuspec file, which is located in the Nughettt.TestPO package and also in some of the packages published by the author Disti, mentioned in Phylum’s report.

Additionally, a package named Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig, almost identically named as the Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.Build.Config (different in only one ‘.’) package from Phylum’s report, contained the same payload as the initial Nughettt.TestPO package, further proving that all of these packages are part of the same campaign. 


Previous research reports from ReversingLabs have warned about security threats in the npm, PyPI and RubyGEMS ecosystems. This newest finding adds the NuGet package repository to that list, and proves that NuGet is equally exposed to malicious activities conducted by threat actors.

Specifically, this research report describes an ongoing campaign which has been targeting the NuGet repository since August 2023. The threat actors behind it are tenacious in their desire to plant malware into the NuGet repository, and to continuously publish new malicious packages. As soon as the previous packages are removed from the repository, ReversingLabs detected newly published packages on a daily basis.

The new malware samples ReversingLabs detected suggest that the malicious actors responsible for this campaign are adopting a documented but uncommon technique that exploits NuGet’s MSBuild integrations feature in order to plant malicious code on their victims. As always, developers need to remain vigilant of the threats lurking in the open source ecosystem.

What's needed is deep visibility inside software packages, to distinguish malicious functions from legitimate ones. This can be challenging with legacy application security testing tools, and demands specialized skills and knowledge that many organizations lack. Modern tools like ReversingLabs Software Supply Chain Security can bridge the gaps, and help development and application security teams protect their supply chain from compromise.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) refer to forensic artifacts or evidence related to a security breach or unauthorized activity on a computer network or system. IOCs play a crucial role in cybersecurity investigations and cyber incident response efforts, helping analysts and cybersecurity professionals identify and detect potential security incidents.

The following IOCs were collected as part of ReversingLabs investigation of this software supply chain campaign. 

NuGet packages:

package_name version SHA1
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.Build.Config 6.5.1 f474da140a91aca8eb75084b8af0580a2a5f9f9c
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.Build.Config 6.5.2 d716dda6b465e16222287f1973454fc6daa62c66
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.Build.Config 6.5.3 c6f7dc7f9e2a5447f966f582d4fe41869ee07275
KucoinExchange.Net 5.0.1 48dfbe8ceb801a556255841e1270bd1f55132572
KucoinExchange.Net 5.0.2 a45b7b2f73864dcc50993cab9465081f6974094b
KucoinExchange.Net 5.0.3 6ee07eb39946ce546f7a96645affa12e568c47ab
Kraken.Exchange 4.1.1 f1b54fa7dc92998d82f7453f7c41e31d86288c18
Kraken.Exchange 4.1.2 2d81de5fe1c88cd5b732deb04e449d13ce60072e
Kraken.Exchange 4.1.3 d056eb9d74c250b337be8b239dfdef55ef78d56a
DiscordsRpc 109c09147586389ba45b7761fd83ec88841e4d59
DiscordsRpc 9e59ca377199ddd839de785cf2dff73aa6670144
DiscordsRpc 23f2faf65e8b0d024a1f9cca80c42c56c62e8184
DiscordsRpc c4b2077af263b72b9e90c815b13e505fe2026e47
DiscordsRpc 68ae280dd3c7b0caa0f5aac3128fc924cc24ab32
SolanaWallet 1.25.1 2a09ef73b8e6e28ffee0aa2daf9e8a1905d389f4
SolanaWallet 1.25.2 40145b10a331be75a7d77577f4577e83e81117a6
SolanaWallet 1.25.3 b7dadebdd6c4b4c978a733fb1ae31857896701ad
SolanaWallet 1.25.4 a405145005cee5823de3531f4c66631d7c4e0033
SolanaWallet 1.25.5 5f7f882c59e31e7d83129d0a09579b47fd931be0
SolanaWallet 1.25.6 8ab0b3b437fa3aaecd89eaa4681d56eb4990cb06
Monero 679875b3bc415fb81f83919f7ecc6f226b372dde
Monero 1d72719509f2f2a6852bb001ad6b52a38489c09d
xopxopxopxopxopx 0706311de6caa47ee4febb54e8aa7e57290281d2
Modern.Winform.UI b548221b4fadcf00bde6567eea11189e0719a812
Modern.Winform.UI e7d54ba61fe291d8ea862ce7a23b9c3cd8e8f988
Modern.Winform.UI 64d257ba67db909446007944fe8d4c145c3b4f03
Modern.Winform.UI 39f5dfd63237530abe5d1e8f418f739992d0d766
Modern.Winform.UI 708e16fee69655dd0ee0ee60220c6395779b0070
Modern.Winform.UI dcfb36931677d0860e62552e35f1d67a5d77e2a1
MinecraftPocket.Server 1.0.2305 4bf3e03363d0e59051d22fdd2e498c02dfb19dd0
CodeExecTest 2.0.0 c03b21f48cf80e5cd9ee89e254d6327d74f5c8fb
IAmRootx 2.0.0 45d715d7597cfaa043b7532efc71f69209d15a51
IAmRootx 2.0.1 f182a3c99fc568d4ebcf22fd7d558d93bd00c7c7
IAmRoot 0.0.1-beta 14af9c50437f4894a44325a6dd45f12ea52c8247
IAmRoot 1.0.0 ae9fd408f32bddddd54329e641984ce7e2ca4310
IAmRoot 1.1.0 2b76e606281d33cb88de47e68a9e456a7c03ab8b
IAmRoot 1.1.3 0c050ea1afbe29f1c4126b778d8ea640f15a9301
IAmRoot 1.1.1 69738f031300662f2cfc034b3f290953918c467b
IAmRoot 1.1.2 de67e07596ccfb2257675b8d4d1d092a86d8d855
IAmRoot 2.0.0 fa7063ab77cc0bc40ebaef5716024174a2d8dbef
ZendeskApi.Client.V2 5.0.6 62f6a2715a379468bbc38b28066e7bda2137fd98
ZendeskApi.Client.V2 5.0.7 d72534b14f5fedcdca0629367f9b93af92bd6bd5
ZendeskApi.Client.V2 5.0.8 bae28ac375dc5b89d0be371f0d4421abe17bde84
ZendeskApi.Client.V2 5.0.9 8950d150f8f7ad70accb928e792e114bfdb22719
ZendeskApi.Client.V2 6.0.0 8a1d7189b2e4547ab730397fe1e95898474c1f41
Betalgo.Open.AI 7.1.8 d9e517e2dc0f54c99727a0f17df9b241a2a1aabc
Betalgo.Open.AI 7.1.9 75361acfb735c1c46f073b7142d66cc944f37bef
Betalgo.Open.AI 7.2.0 ec5bd0c43eef8a94b340e64cf6e649d65b9a9d90
Forge.Open.AI 1.1.3 d18e6074b797bcf80d0a203fc9c278eeaded44b9
Forge.Open.AI 1.1.4 d46c0641697e18011bd084cb62110ffc394b9ae8
Forge.Open.AI 1.1.5 3ffe89ee4b7a3cb9184ffe84aa0279c91b5b8dca
Forge.Open.AI 1.1.6 c0f04c7b015cff331921b7996f66a762a430e76a
Nughettt.TestPO 1.0.0 a11ac467846b4e3e541b74d6d59ec8d5e6fcbb6f
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.2.1 ff0990ce50448be5f19c89d4ac2d18714facb566
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.2.2 0f88db4448334cf5bb75542a955475f42dca004d
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.2.3 1044dc4fccab73c8d238b5d4505adc67b977dcb4
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.2.4 f1ccafe37c8b84f83d1954b9ae438d7cf0eec42a
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.2.5 853254467e9667efab60ed800f0a5021232a8c83
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.2.6 a4c3569b076113b4d1258c7210cb3c5a242659cc
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.2.7 c6ff26c0670806aa80d7f1d5bc7d662b263b1124
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.2.8 d81a7608a97b44af04157dd9086c4e2e46c93369
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.2.9 9cfb17c19ea29dba6a4dfb4281633660c74f6cf0
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.3.1 993d0f3594b217573b504d5f190670d480d386b9
Pathoschild.Stardew.Mod.BuildConfig 6.5.1 f5e8e315fc6a0cd7cb452859e492ed45da6c932f
CData.NetSuite.Net.Framework 23.0.8669 247ad37694ea0eaaf93ee9eaffda22703b0653b4
CData.NetSuite.Net.Framework 23.0.8670 1c03781c4033d160dabe18bcc38504ef21eb56a8
CData.NetSuite.Net.Framework 23.0.8671 9490bf38a151fc0f3b99d940bb04359792862e95
CData.Salesforce.Net.Framework 23.0.8669 fae0697f55d9244980bffdf65216f98961153953
CData.Salesforce.Net.Framework 23.0.8670 b4e6deceabaef67d64865cbe6197397dec420a86
CData.Salesforce.Net.Framework 23.0.8671 ff9d0e9f91e9837069c302539747fd1a1f2140c3
CData.Snowflake.API 23.0.8669 fdc40bf0a0b372358767670e7b9e518c8208962d
CData.Snowflake.API 23.0.8670 b6a2589eade5649b6ad41237a38d1547634a4148
CData.Snowflake.API 23.0.8671 79c52e34bdbbe00fb54f3c78817223436596b1c4
CData.Snowflake.EntityFramework.Net 23.0.8669 f30b9cb625fde948fc00724a370a4420e1426732
CData.Snowflake.EntityFramework.Net 23.0.8670 03d5532e39357ec0422614a7913e2a426beb0730
CData.Snowflake.EntityFramework.Net 23.0.8671 1ccec9016788bdacae3635eab81a322258f314a9
Chronos.Contracts.Net 12dbb19aa8059f0c73a689db48bc86dcff757d3d
Chronos.Platform.Linux.API 1d369efe94859986f549ae0ecde92750fd3e147f
Chronos.Platforms 7026a7f2b50bd4999927b59e58a18601891ecfc6
LazyProxy.Unity.Net 1.0.2 e33ec6d268711f7b882c00c568002c27ef995bfc
Stl.Blazor.Authentication.Net 6.5.8 47896d0cf5c8d10bd03b57d1d1f5005b1f67cdd9
Stl.Blazor.Authentication.Net 6.5.9 2cab3c7e4781bd5f0e35d40c4382ad0ebad3ebb4
Stl.CommandLine.Net 0.2.22 c6d6e5f66f50793bee955a6abd3ece7a1e0c3eac
Stl.CommandLine.Net 0.2.23 519767ceb3af15336f8ecfcc09d5ba9237a9ff9d
Stl.Fusion.Ext.Contracts.Net 6.5.8 cdda2b33879b3e2d028b3099cc7e885501c8e00d
Stl.Fusion.Ext.Contracts.Net 6.5.9 7987192d807124f8a4c5c45399dff7b77349a6cb
Stl.Fusion.Ext.Services.Net 6.5.8 1bb64c3b078440c7bf7f3130bfa1e0f64fb56e71
Stl.Fusion.Ext.Services.Net 6.5.9 5702153b0b44071d916f099d75155f1867d80e4a
Stl.Generators.Net 6.5.8 8123f5fab4cc5acfaee5f419b1efba52a69ac456
Stl.Generators.Net 6.5.9 d959ac811872fde62386725456a937b943e236ee
Stl.Plugins.Extensions.Net 0.2.22 96aa8d35910118e51eb962c5b6a5f64e9c3f8f99
Stl.Plugins.Extensions.Net 0.2.23 0170734a8a42976aa20cbc09e999433c1aabed9b
Stl.RestEase.Net 6.5.8 2a22fa4277644bf07a4b92575248cf4b931e8614
Stl.RestEase.Net 6.5.9 f0220fdc65fe5a4be3cf67b9d2eea44c79473117
Stl.Rpc.Server.Core 6.5.8 72fe525e541fca4b7766d05bd0d0162c32002fa1
Stl.Rpc.Server.Core 6.5.9 95ec7567218829bc95d4b10d546186116b477ad8
Stl.Rpc.Server.Net.Fx 6.5.8 922bb97ba1bff39324f79daf305fb021bf42246c
Stl.Rpc.Server.Net.Fx 6.5.9 3fc3056ac2736278aa11c8deaad012d9a8e9de3b
Syntellect.Winium.Cruciatus.Net 3.1.0 34f7c52873404ca899733d95899c5b8cf1d76db6
Syntellect.Winium.Element 0.2.1 d014e8287dd2430386cadeb5fcea324dff82ce10
Syntellect.Winium.Web.Driver 0.1.2 fe30654a7947c337a6718679df8ee436da7f8e0e
Tessa.Analyzer c19e63c685b85bc50b0bc6a8124f19d1c3d4a0f0
Tessa.Compilations 3.4.0 1ddff92c47b04502fe2d5a6e0a87545cc8e4df54
Tessa.Core 390afcb6201d1d6ef85dbac9ca472d7f3d19628b
Tessa.Linux.V2 28985a918ff7b537daa912c49d7f907e6e82a104
Tessa.Net.V2 e5225a52fa7ca6f5f2581bbb6db54a0ae9e5d529
Tessa.Postgre.Sql ac9043342bfcab56689bff96bd5d8a03ba7c37c4
Tessa.Server.Net 00d153ba2f6bbe0be3c67096565f07ce66cbe2e8
Tessa.UI2 c11f384c065a51871155a1a59e77f69d49daad15
Tessa.Web.Client.Net 7e4b02793685f3835231c46ea60c767c84b13366
Tessa.Web.Core b604a24356f337f9d6806bc328d9980ea7020eed
Tessa.Windows.V2 3.4.0 11ebf1f7a6c974915ac1575bbcc13d26ca8baa0f
Celigo.Service.Manager.NetSuite 7.1.2 16d256f3daf8982ea5a3d7cb469dfd824b5f4f9c
Celigo.Service.Manager.NetSuite.REST 1.3.1 d64b2da8fcc14c51d707acebbd4ebcf93eb55fd9
Celigo.Suite.Talk 7.1.2 d2832302dc687e260354be8143c69fc90144dc9b
DistributedLocks.AzureStorage.Net 1.0.2 dfbb6853f84d78f989deba3235cef26f51fd4d70
EBBuildClient.Net 1.0.92 5409be191e8cec6edaf111a5481b62ecd80205c7
LagoVista.CloudStorage.Net 3.0.2287.946 1f3f9b4188ecf54a997a7d51ec8e21dbd3165df5
OCI.DotNetSDK.Ai.speech 73.0.0 ed6e7868bfab896663c91a4b242dac93943c2d19
OCI.DotNetSDK.Ai.vision 73.0.0 db57c5769ac4997c6d6cc06009b0c19864cd6886
OCI.DotNetSDK.Apm.config 73.0.0 5798a6be7106029a2f6fca860dbfd96e3caa601d
OCI.DotNetSDK.Appmgmtcontrol.Net 73.0.0 7fbcfa699b56e55d2089294a1edd61cd55cbae61
OCI.DotNetSDK.Certificates.Net 73.0.0 f3dd64b8314afab0d47f0859c6346b97670514b1
OCI.DotNetSDK.Certificatesmanagement.Net 73.0.0 194e0a759a52371c69af70ff98dd0d25ec44e69f
OCI.DotNetSDK.Dashboard.service 73.0.0 83f9fb69c198e24ae67f67871269b088053285c0
OCI.DotNetSDK.Databasetools.Net 73.0.0 73e8cf24d205e6800a448f292cb90dd845f109f8
OCI.DotNetSDK.Datalabeling.service 73.0.0 d05d1aa8f90e145cda664a3b8823482c1e0a0e92
OCI.DotNetSDK.File.storage 73.0.0 67508b2a6cfa6532994e30f8924a1f2566c32f20
OCI.DotNetSDK.Net 73.0.0 fabac069323a7521c37052c55c2abb0a7c28ee0a
OCI.DotNetSDK.Ospgateway.Net 73.0.0 250091edab3a9ec2f5d207b174677900f874aaad
OCI.DotNetSDK.Osubbillingschedule.Net 73.0.0 d52d9ad3a258ac47b33c58320303f65e0a366cd3
OCI.DotNetSDK.Osuborganizationsubscription.Net 73.0.0 dd00638e3a9201d645d96a97d0ebe58b73da5fef
OCI.DotNetSDK.Osubsubscription.Net 73.0.0 413c8f589aea0a1295f0dfb481f741eb3d7aa744
OCI.DotNetSDK.Osubusage.Net 73.0.0 50e5192337e5b8df41a31bc8daead884e7838d82
OCI.DotNetSDK.Servicemanager.proxy 73.0.0 f1acc14265a44ea98d5539885329e36a9c8bbd5b
OCI.DotNetSDK.Threat.intelligence 73.0.0 9f57f74b0d586c74c3602de6ef404b76997d4785
OCI.DotNetSDK.Usage.Net 73.0.0 f9549c90de2134e2540aa44a043ed61fa202f9e5
OCI.DotNetSDK.Visualbuilder.Net 73.0.0 0979601ec510bf0c48563a63391a941fa62133b3
OCI.DotNetSDK.Waf.Net 73.0.0 e54ec3cbc36f4ee0832aa231df2de893d4329546



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ConversingLabs: The State of Open Source Software Security ConversingLabs: The State of Open Source Software Security
Conversations About Threat Hunting and Software Supply Chain Security
ReversingGlass: SBOMS and threat modeling ReversingGlass: SBOMS and threat modeling
Glassboard conversations with ReversingLabs Field CISO Matt Rose
Software Package Deconstruction: Video Conferencing Software Software Package Deconstruction: Video Conferencing Software
Analyzing Risks To Your Software Supply Chain